Dharmakirti on the Duality of the Object: Pramanavarttika III (Leipziger Studien zu Kultur und Geschichte Sud- und Zentralasiens) [Eli Franco, Miyako. : Dharmakirti’s Pramanavarttika: An Annotated Translation of the Fourth Chapter (Parathanumana): 1 (Veroffentlichungen Zu Den Sprachen Und. Japan’s largest platform for academic e-journals: J-STAGE is a full text database for reviewed academic papers published by Japanese societies.

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Finally, note that the syntax of k. How do his two positions hang together? Vibhuticandra’s note 3 to PVV ad k.

Dharmakirti’s Pramanavarttika, the Chapter of Pratyaksa -an annoted translation (4)-

We see in k. There is thus no need to specify “sound” as being the “sound- qua-particular” sabdasvalaksana. A sense perception establishes and falsifies, not because it is in itself propositional knowledge, but because of the simple fact that it exists and does actually apprehend its corresponding particular. The answer which emerges see, e. The “reason that is unestablished asiddha because of the nonexistence of the entity of the subject” chos can gyi ho bo med nas ma grub pa’i gtan tshig is a subdivision of the first category.

It is only after criteria a and b have been satisfied that one may proceed to c —this is the point of k. Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University. Words designate primarily mentally created fictions. Whatever is fit to be associated with the image of a word can be designated by an agreed upon word.


Note that there are some variations in the formulation of this so-called “inference consisting in an acknowledgment [of fitness]” grags pa’i rjes dpag. NAM Ai C.

However, as Dreyfus shows, the passages from PVinT and others are interpreted in different fashions by Pramanavarttkia, so that it should be cautioned that there is no Tibetan consensus here. Then we would have to translate: Much of the argument here in Buddhist Epistemology and in other schools of Buddhism is essentially an appeal to perceptual evidence and common sense: Theses such as “sound is not pramahavarttika object of a means of valid cognition” or “sound is permanent” can only be refuted by conceptual cognitions having the form S is P, where a universal property is attributed to a subject.

Briefly said, the negative existential proof would turn out to be self-refuting. Log In Sign Up.

The key step in the argument is that nothing causes new effects while itself remaining the same. Dharmaklrti argues that in fact sattva is not an isolated case: The Asiatic Society, Calcutta [Reprinted in ]. Jinendrabuddhi also discusses this example; see p.

It would seem to us that “co-presence” and “co-absence” captures the essential idea, and this is accordingly the translation which we shall adopt for these two technical terms. Up until now Dharmakirti has emphasized that svadharmini serves to show that there can be two ways in which prqmanavarttika thesis can be invalidated, i.

Dharmaklrti replies that in that case there is the following dilemma: Indeed, what [the Buddhist] intended to prove was that pleasure, etc. Dhadmakirti, the word “candra” would pramanavarttuka be fit to designate the actual moon, i. Now if the permanence which is the nature of pleasure, etc.


Devendrabuddhi glosses the term adrsta in k. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 52, The other interpretation of PV IV, k. In effect, the proponent says S’ is P but actually means that S is P, the difference between Sf and S being that the former is the opponent’s version of the entity in question and the latter is what the proponent intends. Hopefully, having the parts united in one book will be useful to the reader.

Well, if observation and non-observation are no basis for knowing the co-presence and co-absence [of smoke and fire], how then does one know that smoke does not deviate na vyabhicarati from fire?


The first chapter discusses the structure and types of formal inference and the apoha exclusion theory of meaning. Materialen zur Kunde des Buddhismus The general philosophical background for k. PVV’s introduction ad k. To bring out the problem, take the following tempting, but invalid, inference: Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien We’ll take up the questions one by one.